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Abstract
Firefox and other major browsers rely on dozens of
third-party libraries to render audio, video, images, and other
content. These libraries are a frequent source of vulnerabil-
ities. To mitigate this threat, we are migrating Firefox to an
architecture that isolates these libraries in lightweight sand-
boxes, dramatically reducing the impact of a compromise.
Retrofitting isolation can be labor-intensive, very prone to
security bugs, and requires critical attention to performance.
To help, we developed RLBox, a framework that minimizes
the burden of converting Firefox to securely and efficiently
use untrusted code. To enable this, RLBox employs static
information flow enforcement, and lightweight dynamic
checks, expressed directly in the C++ type system.
RLBox supports efficient sandboxing through either
software-based-fault isolation or multi-core process isolation.
Performance overheads are modest and transient, and have
only minor impact on page latency. We demonstrate this by
sandboxing performance-sensitive image decoding libraries
(libjpeg and libpng), video decoding libraries (libtheora and
libvpx), the libvorbis audio decoding library, and the zlib
decompression library.
RLBox, using a WebAssembly sandbox, has been inte-
grated into production Firefox to sandbox the libGraphite font
shaping library.
1 Introduction
All major browsers today employ coarse grain privilege
separation to limit the impact of vulnerabilities. To wit,
they run renderers—the portion of the browser that handles
untrusted user content from HTML parsing, to JavaScript
execution, to image decoding and rendering—in separate
sandboxed processes [3, 33, 39]. This stops web attackers
that manage to compromise the renderer from abusing local
OS resources to, say, install malware.
Unfortunately, this is no longer enough: nearly every-
thing we care about today is done through a website. By
compromising the renderer, an attacker gets total control of
the current site and, often, any other sites the browser has
credentials for [14]. With services like Dropbox and Google
Drive, privilege separation is insufficient even to protect local
files that sync with the cloud [24].
Browser vendors spend a huge amount of engineering
effort trying to find renderer vulnerabilities in their own
code [28]. Unfortunately, many remain—frequently in the
dozens of third-party libraries used by the renderer to decode
audio, images, fonts, and other content. For example, an
out-of-bounds write in libvorbis was used to exploit Firefox at
Pwn2Own 2018 [7]. Both Chrome and Firefox were vulner-
able to an integer-overflow bug in the libvpx video decoding
library [10]. Both also rely on the Skia graphics library, which
had four remote code execution bugs until recently [12, 36].
To appreciate the impact of these vulnerabilities and the
difficulty of mitigating them, consider a typical web user,
Alice, that uses Gmail to read email in her browser. Suppose
an intruder, Trudy, sends Alice an email that contains a link
to her malicious site, hosted on sites.google.com. If Alice
clicks on the link, her browser will navigate her to Trudy’s
site, which can embed an .ogg audio track or .webm video to
exploit vulnerabilities in libvorbis and libvpx and compromise
the renderer of Alice’s browser. Trudy now has total control
of Alice’s Gmail account. Trudy can read and send emails
as Alice, for example, to respond to password reset requests
from other sites Alice belongs to. In most cases, Trudy can
also attack cross site [14], i.e., she can access any other site
that Alice is logged into (e.g., Alice’s amazon.com account).
Recent version of Chrome (and upcoming versions of Fire-
fox) support Site Isolation [40], which isolates different sites
from each other (e.g., *.google.com from *.amazon.com)
to prevent such cross-site attacks. Unfortunately, Trudy might
still be able to access {drive,pay,cloud}.google.com,
which manage Alice’s files, online payments, and cloud
infrastructure—since the renderer that loads the malicious
.ogg and .webm content might still be running in the same
process as those origins.
For many sites, Trudy might not even need to up-
load malicious content to the (trusted) victim origin
(sites.google.com in our example). Most web applications
load content, including images, fonts, and video, from
different origins. Of the Alexa top 500 websites, for example,
over 93% of the sites load at least one such cross-origin
resource (§7.1). And the libraries handling such content
are not isolated from the embedding origin, even with Site
Isolation [40].
To mitigate these vulnerabilities, we need to harden the
renderer itself. To this end, we extend the Firefox renderer to
isolate third party libraries in fine grain sandboxes. Using this,
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we can prevent a compromised library from gaining control
of the current origin or any other origin in the browser.
Making this practical poses three significant challenges
across three dimensions. First, engineering effort—we need to
minimize the upfront work required to change the renderer to
use sandboxing, especially as this is multiplied across dozens
of libraries; minimizing changes to libraries is also important
as this can significantly increase the burden of tracking up-
stream changes. Second, security—the renderer was not built
to protect itself from libraries; thus, we have to sanitize all data
and regulate control flow between the library and renderer
to prevent libraries from breaking out of the sandbox. In our
experience, bugs at the library-renderer boundary are not only
easy to overlook, but can nullify any sandboxing effort—and
other developers, not just us, must be able to securely sandbox
new libraries. Finally, efficiency—the renderer is performance
critical, so adding user-visible latency is not acceptable.
To help us address these challenges, we develop a
framework called RLBox that makes data- and control-flow
at the library-renderer interface explicit, using types. Unlike
prior approaches to sandbox automation that rely on extensive
custom analysis frameworks (§8), RLBox is simply a library1
that leverages the C++ type system and is easy to incorporate
into Firefox’s predominantly C++ codebase.
Using type information, RLBox can identify where security
checks are needed, automatically insert dynamic checks when
possible, and force compiler errors for any security checks
that require additional user intervention. Our type-driven
approach enables a systematic way to migrate Firefox’s
renderer to use sandboxed libraries and allows RLBox to
support secure and efficient sharing of data structures between
the renderer and library (e.g., by making shared memory
operations safe and by lazily copying data out of the sandbox).
To enable efficient sandboxing, we adapt and evaluate two
isolation mechanisms for library sandboxing: software-based
fault isolation (SFI) leveraging Google’s Native Client
(NaCl) [48, 64] and a multi-core process-based approach. We
also explore applying sandboxing at different granularities
(e.g., per-origin and per-library sandboxing) to find the ap-
propriate balance between security and sandboxing overhead.
To evaluate RLBox, we sandbox several libraries in Firefox:
the libjpeg and libpng image decoding libraries, the libvpx and
libtheora video decoding libraries, the libvorbis audio decod-
ing library, and the zlib decompression library. Browsing a
representative sample of both popular and unpopular websites
(§7), we find the end-to-end memory overhead of RLBox to
be modest—25% with SFI, 18% with process isolation—and
transient, appearing only at content load time. The impact
on page latency is small: 3% and 13% with SFI and process
isolation, respectively. Our sandboxing does not noticeably
impact the video frame rates nor audio decoding bitrate.
1 Our only external tooling is a ~100LOC Clang plugin, described in
Section 6.1, that makes up for C++’s currently limited support for reflection
on structs.
Our evaluation shows that retrofitting fine grain isolation,
especially using SFI, is practical—and we’ve been integrating
RLBox into production Firefox [50].2 Since NaCl has been
deprecated [17] in favor of WebAssembly (Wasm) [20], our
production sandbox also uses Wasm. We used RLBox with
this Wasm-based sandbox to isolate the libGraphite font
shaping library and are in the process of migrating several
others [15, 50]. We describe this effort in Section 9.
Though we developed RLBox to sandbox libraries in Fire-
fox, RLBox is a general library-sandboxing framework that
can be used outside Firefox. To demonstrate this, we use RL-
Box to sandbox libraries in two different contexts: the Apache
web server and Node.js runtime. For Apache, we sandbox
the libmarkdown library that is used in the mod_markdown
module [31]; we find that RLBox with the SFI sandbox
increases the tail latency of the Apache server by 10% (4ms)
and decreases the throughput by 27% (256 requests/second).
For Node.js, we sandbox the C bcrypt library that is used by
the JavaScript bcrypt module [37]; we measure RLBox with
SFI to impose an overhead of 27% on hashing throughput.
Contributions. We present the case for sandboxing third
party libraries in the browser renderer, and potential archi-
tectural trade-offs, including our approach (§2). We offer a
taxonomy of security pitfalls encountered while migrating
the Firefox code base to this architecture that were largely
overlooked by previous work (§3), and RLBox, a framework
we developed to prevent these pitfalls that leverages the
C++ type system to enforce safe data and control flow (§4),
and enables an incremental compiler-driven approach to
migrating code to a sandboxed architecture (§5). We describe
our implementation, including our software fault isolation
and multi-core process-based isolation mechanisms (§6), and
evaluate the performance of RLBox (§7). We close with a
discussion of related work (§8) and our effort upstreaming
RLBox into production Firefox (§9).
Availability. All work presented in this paper, including our
modified Firefox builds, the RLBox library, and benchmarks
are available and open source.3
2 Fine grain sandboxing: how and why
Renderers rely on dozens of third-party libraries to support
media decoding and other tasks (e.g., decompression,
which sites use to optimize page load times and bandwidth
consumption). These are written almost exclusively in C
and tasked with parsing a wide range of complex inputs.
Unsurprisingly, exploitable vulnerabilities in this code are
relatively frequent, even after years of scrutiny.
These libraries are a compelling place to employ sandbox-
ing inside the renderer for several reasons. First, media content
such as images and video are rich attack vectors, as web
applications allow them to be shared pervasively. Over 93%
2The Tor team is integrating our patches into the Tor Browser [16].
3 Available at: https://usenix2020-aec.rlbox.dev.
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of the Alexa Top 500 websites load such content cross-origin
(§7.1). And nearly all forms of social media and peer-to-peer
messaging platforms enable the sharing of images and video.
Next, content libraries can be effectively sandboxed, as
they require little privilege to operate, i.e., once these libraries
are memory isolated, the harm they can inflict is minimal. For
example, an attacker that compromises an image decoding
library could at worst change how images display. In contrast,
sandboxing a highly privileged component like the JavaScript
engine is largely ineffectual. An attacker with control over
the JavaScript engine can run arbitrary JavaScript code and
thus already has complete control of the web application.
Finally, the existing library-renderer interface provides
a natural place to partition code. Compared to coarse grain
techniques like privilege separation or Site Isolation, which
spin up entire new renderer processes, spinning up a sandbox
for a library is very cheap (§7). Moreover, because library
sandboxes are only needed during content decoding, their
memory overhead is transient.
Isolation strategies. A key question remains: what grain
of isolation should be employed? In particular, different
architectures have different implications for performance
and security. Prior to RLBox, Firefox was largely exploring a
coarse grain approach to library sandboxing, placing certain
media libraries into a single sandboxed media process [33].
This approach has some benefits for performance as there
is only one sandbox, but trades off security.
First, the assurance of the sandbox is reduced to that of
the weakest library. This is less than ideal, especially when
we consider the long tail of infrequently used media libraries
required to preserve web compatibility (e.g., Theora) which
often contain bugs. Next, the attacker gains the power of the
most capable library. Some libraries handle active content—
zlib, for example, is used to decompress HTTP requests that
could contain HTML or JavaScript—as opposed to passive
content such as images or fonts. Thus compromising a passive
library like libvorbis, could still enable powerful attacks—e.g.,
modify the JavaScript decompressed by zlib. When multiple
renderers share a common library sandbox, an intruder can
attack across tabs, browsing profiles, or sites. Finally, coarse
grain sandboxing does not scale to highly performance-
critical libraries, such as libjpeg and libpng (§7.5.2).
RLBox lets us employ more granular sandboxing policies
that can address these shortcomings. Its flexibility lets us
explore the performance implications of various sandboxing
architectures with different isolation mechanisms (§7.4).
In this paper, we largely employ a unique sandbox per
<renderer, library, content-origin, content-type>.
This mitigates many of the problems noted above, while still
offering modest memory overheads. Per-renderer sandboxing
prevents attacks across tabs and browsing profiles. Per-library
ensures that a weakness in one library does not impact
any other library. Per-content-origin sandboxing prevents
cross origin (and thus cross site) attacks on content. For
example, a compromise on sites.google.com as discussed
in our example in Section 1, should not impact content from
pay.google.com. Per-content-type sandboxing addresses
the problem of passive content influencing active content.
Both finer and coarser grain policies are practically useful,
though. In production Firefox, for example, we create a fresh
sandbox for each Graphite font instance (§9). But, we also
foresee libraries where, say, same-origin is sufficient.
Attacker model. We assume a web attacker that serves
malicious (but passive) content—from an origin they control
or by uploading the content to a trusted origin—which leads
to code execution (e.g., via a memory safety vulnerability)
in a RLBox sandbox. RLBox ensures that such an attacker
can only affect (corrupt the rendering of and potentially leak)
content of the same type, from the same origin. Per-object
(or per-instance) sandboxing can further reduce the damage
of such attacks. We, however, only use this policy when
sandboxing audio, videos, and font shaping—we found the
overheads of doing this for images to be prohibitive.
We consider side channels out-of-scope, orthogonal chal-
lenges. With side channels, an attacker doesn’t need to exploit
renderer vulnerabilities to learn cross-origin information,
as browsers like Firefox largely do not prevent cross-origin
leaks via side channels. FuzzyFox [27] and cross-origin read
blocking [40] are promising ways to tackle these channels.
For the same reason, we consider transient execution
attacks (e.g., Spectre [26]) out of scope. We believe that our
SFI and our process-based isolation mechanisms make many
of these attacks harder to carry out—e.g., by limiting transient
reads and control flow to the sandbox memory and code,
respectively—much like Site Isolation [40]. But, in general,
this is not enough: an attacker could potentially exploit code
in the renderer to transiently leak sensitive data. We leave
the design of a Spectre-robust sandbox to future work.
The protections offered by RLBox are only valid if the
Firefox code that interfaces with the sandboxed library
code is retrofitted to account for untrusted code running
in the library sandbox. As we discuss next, this is usually
notoriously difficult to get right. RLBox precisely reduces
this burden to writing a series of validation functions. In our
attacker model, we assume these functions to be correct.
3 Pitfalls of retrofitting protection
The Firefox renderer was written assuming libraries are
trusted. To benefit from sandboxing requires changing our
threat model to assume libraries are untrusted, and modify
the renderer-library interface accordingly (e.g, to sanitize
untrusted inputs).
While migrating to this model we made numerous
mistakes—overlooking attack vectors and discovering many
bugs only after building RLBox to help detect them. We
present a brief taxonomy of these mistakes, with examples
drawn from the code snippet illustrating the interface
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between the renderer’s JPEG decoder and libjpeg4 shown in
Figure 1. We discuss how RLBox helps prevent these attacks
in Section 4.
For the rest of this section, we assume that libjpeg is fully
sandboxed or memory isolated, i.e., libjpeg code is restricted
from accessing arbitrary memory locations in the renderer
process, and may only access memory explicitly dedicated
to the sandbox—the sandbox memory. The renderer itself
can access any memory location including sandbox memory.
3.1 Insecure data flow
Failing to sanitize data. Failing to sanitize data received
from libjpeg including function return values, callback param-
eters, and data read from sandbox shared memory can leave
the renderer vulnerable to attack. For example, if the renderer
uses the num_bytes parameter to the skip_input_data()
callback on line 25 of Figure 1 without bounds checking it,
an attacker-controlled libjpeg could could force it to overflow
or underflow the src->next_input_byte buffer.
Pointer data is particularly prone to attack, either when
pointers are used directly (with C++’s * and -> operators)
or indirectly (via memory functions such as memcpy() and
memmove(), array indexing operations, etc.). For example,
if the parameter jd of fill_input_buffer() is not sanitized
(line 35), the read of jd->src on line 36 becomes an
arbitrary-read gadget. In the same callback, if both jd and
src are unsanitized, the write to src->next_input_byte on
line 39 becomes an arbitrary-write gadget. Similar attacks
using the memmove() on line 50 are possible.
Missing pointer swizzles. Some sandboxing mechanisms—
e.g., NaCl (§6.2) and Wasm (§9)—use alternate pointer
representations. Some sandboxing tools e.g., NaCl (§6.2) and
Wasm (§9) use alternate pointer representations for efficiency.
Though this is often done for performance, in Wasm’s case
this is more fundamental: Wasm pointers are 32-bit whereas
Firefox pointers are 64-bit. We must translate or swizzle
pointers to and from these alternate representations when data
is transferred between the renderer and the sandboxed libjpeg.
We found that doing this manually is both tedious and
extremely error prone. This is largely because pointers
can be buried many levels deep in nested data structures.
Overlooking a swizzle either breaks things outright, or worse,
silently introduces vulnerabilities. For instance, failing to
swizzle the nested pointer mInfo.err on line 44 prior to
dereferencing, can result in a write gadget (whose write-range
depends on the precise pointer representation).
Leaking pointers. Leaking pointers from the Firefox
renderer to the sandboxed libjpeg can allow an attacker to
derandomize ASLR [49] or otherwise learn locations of
code pointers (e.g., C++ virtual tables). Together with an
4We use libjpeg interchangeably with libjpeg-turbo, the faster fork of the
original libjpeg library which is used in Firefox.
1 // InitInternal() registers callbacks
for libjpeg to call while decoding an image↪→
2 nsresult nsJPEGDecoder::InitInternal() {
3 ...
4 mInfo.client_data = (void*)this;
5 ...
6 //Callbacks invoked by libjpeg
7 mErr.pub.error_exit = my_error_exit;
8 mSourceMgr.fill_input_buffer = fill_input_buffer;
9 mSourceMgr.skip_input_data = skip_input_data;
10 ...
11 }
12
13 // Adjust output buffers for decoded pixels
14 void nsJPEGDecoder::OutputScanlines(...) {
15 ...
16 while (mInfo.output_scanline < mInfo.output_height) {
17 ...
18 imageRow = ... +
(mInfo.output_scanline * mInfo.output_width);↪→
19 ...
20 }
21 ...
22 }
23
24 // Invoked if some input bytes are not needed
25 void skip_input_data (..., long num_bytes) {
26 ...
27 if (num_bytes > (long)src->bytes_in_buffer) {
28 ...
29 } else {
30 src->next_input_byte += num_bytes;
31 }
32 }
33
34 // Invoked repeatedly to get input as it arrives
35 void fill_input_buffer (j_decompress_ptr jd) {
36 struct jpeg_source_mgr* src = jd->src;
37 nsJPEGDecoder* decoder = jd->client_data;
38 ...
39 src->next_input_byte = new_buffer;
40 ...
41 if (/* buffer is too small */) {
42 JOCTET* buf = (JOCTET*) realloc(...);
43 if (!buf) {
44 decoder->mInfo.err->msg_code = JERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
45 ...
46 }
47 ...
48 }
49 ...
50 memmove(decoder->mBackBuffer + decoder->mBackBufferLen,
src->next_input_byte, src->bytes_in_buffer);↪→
51 ...
52 }
53
54 // Invoked on a decoding error
55 void my_error_exit (j_common_ptr cinfo) {
56 decoder_error_mgr* err = cinfo->err;
57 ...
58 longjmp(err->setjmp_buffer, error_code);
59 }
Figure 1: The renderer-library interface: this code snippet
illustrates the renderer’s interface to the JPEG decoder and is used
as a running example. The decoder uses libjpeg’s streaming interface
to decode images one pixel-row at a time, as they are received.
Receiving and decoding concurrently is critical for responsiveness.
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arbitrary-write gadget, this can allow an attacker-controlled
libjpeg to execute arbitrary code in the renderer.
In our example, the renderer saves pointers to
nsJPEGDecoder objects in libjpeg structs (line 4),
which alone allows an attacker to locate code pointers—the
nsJPEGDecoder class is derived from the Decoder class, which
defines virtual methods and thus has a virtual table pointer as
the first field. Even initializing callbacks (line 8) could leak
pointers to functions and reveal the location of Firefox’s code
segment5.
Double fetch bugs. RLBox uses shared memory (§4) to
efficiently marshal objects between the renderer and the
sandboxed libraries. This, unfortunately, introduces the
possibility of double fetch bugs [46, 61, 63].
Consider the mInfo object used in Figure 1. Since this
object is used by both libjpeg and the renderer, RLBox stores
it in shared memory. Now consider the bounds check of
mInfo.output_scanline on line 16 prior to the assignment
of output buffer imageRow. In a concurrent libjpeg sandbox
thread, an attacker can modify mInfo.output_scanline after
the check (line 16), and before the value is fetched (again)
and used on line 18. This would bypasses the bounds check,
leading to an arbitrary-write gadget. While this example is
obvious, double-fetch bugs often span function boundaries
and are much harder to spot.
3.2 Insecure control flow
Isolation prevents arbitrary control transfers from the sandbox
into the renderer. Thus, out of necessity, callbacks for libjpeg
must be explicitly exposed. But this alone is not sufficient
to prevent attacks.
Corrupted callback state. Callbacks may save state in the
sandboxed library. An attacker-controlled libjpeg can abuse
the control flow of callbacks by corrupting this state. For
example, on line 4 of Figure 1, the renderer stores a pointer
to the nsJPEGDecoder object into the client_data field of
mInfo. Inside fill_input_buffer() this pointer is used to
access the nsJPEGDecoder object (line 37). Failing to sanitize
client_data before using it allows an attacker to set the
pointer to a maliciously crafted object and hijack control flow
when Firefox invokes a virtual method on this object.
Unexpected callback invocation. Security bugs can also
occur if an attacker controlled libjpeg invokes a permitted
callback at unexpected times. Consider the my_error_exit()
callback function, which uses longjmp() to implement error
handling. On line 58, longjmp() changes the instruction
pointer of the renderer based on information stored in
setjmp_buffer. If an attacker invokes my_error_exit()
before setjmp_buffer is initialized, they can (again) hijack
the renderer control flow.
5Whether callback locations are leaked depends on the underlying
sandboxing mechanism. While both our process isolation and NaCl use
jump tables and thus do not leak, other sandbox implementations could leak
such information.
Callback state exchange attacks. Threading introduces
another vector to attack callback state. When Firefox
decodes two images in parallel, two decoder threads
make calls to libjpeg. Firefox expects libjpeg to invoke the
fill_input_buffer() callback on each thread with the
corresponding nsJPEGDecoder object. But, an attacker could
supply the same nsJPEGDecoder object to both threads when
calling fill_input_buffer(). If the first thread reallocates
the source buffer (line 42), while the second thread is
using it to get input bytes, this can induce a data race and
use-after-free vulnerability in turn.
4 RLBox: automating secure sandboxing
Modifying the Firefox JPEG decoder to guard against all
the attacks discussed in Section 3 requires substantial code
additions and modifications. Doing this manually is extremely
error prone. Moreover, it also makes the code exceedingly
fragile: anyone making subsequent changes to the decoder
must now have an intimate knowledge of all the necessary
checks to have any hope of getting it right. Multiply this by the
number of libraries Firefox supports and number of developers
working on the renderer, and the problem becomes intractable.
We built the RLBox framework to tackle these challenges.
RLBox helps developers migrate and maintain code in
the Firefox renderer to safely use sandboxed libraries. We
designed RLBox with the following goals in mind:
1. Automate security checks: Adding security checks
un-assisted is labor intensive and error prone, as dis-
cussed (§3). However, most of the sandboxing pitfalls
can be detected and prevented through static checks, i.e.,
through compile-time errors indicating where code needs
to be manually changed for security, or eliminated with
dynamic checks and sanitizations (e.g., pointer swizzling
and bounds checking).
2. No library changes: We want to avoid making changes to
libraries. When libraries come from third parties we do not
necessarily understand their internals, nor do we want to.
Additionally, any changes we make to libraries increases
the effort required to track upstream changes.
3. Simplify migration: Firefox uses dozens of libraries, with
occasional additions or replacements. Consequently, we
want to minimize the per-library effort of using RLBox,
and minimize changes to the Firefox renderer source.
In the rest of the section we give an overview of the RLBox
framework and describe how RLBox addresses the pitfalls
of Section 3 while preserving these goals.
4.1 RLBox overview
RLBox makes data and control flow at the renderer-sandbox
interface explicit through its type system and APIs in order
to mediate these flows and enforce security checks across the
trust boundary.
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RLBox mediates data flow with tainted types that impose
a simple static information flow control (IFC) discipline [41].
This ensures that sandbox data is validated before any
potentially unsafe use. It also prevents pointer leaks into the
sandbox that could break ASLR.
RLBox mediates control flow through a combination of
tainted types and API design. Tainting, for example, allows
RLBox to prevent branching on tainted values that have
not been validated. API design, on the other hand, is used
to restrict control transfers between the renderer and sandbox.
For instance, the renderer must use sandbox_invoke() to
invoke functions in the sandbox; any callback into the
renderer by the sandbox must first be registered by the
renderer using the sandbox_callback(callback_fn) API.
Mediating control and data flow allows RLBox to:
I Automate security checks: Swizzling operations, per-
forming checks that ensure sandbox-supplied pointers point
to sandbox memory, and identifying locations where tainted
data must be validated is done automatically.
I Minimize renderer changes: tainted data validation is
enforced only when necessary. Thus, benign operations
such as adding or assigning tainted values, or writing to
tainted pointers (which are checked to ensure they point
into the sandbox at creation time) are allowed by RLBox’s
type system. This eliminates needless changes to the ren-
derer, while still ensuring safety.
I Efficiently share data structures: Static checks ensure
that shared data is allocated in sandbox memory and ac-
cessed via tainted types. Data structures received by the
renderer sandbox are marshaled lazily; this allows code to
access a single field in a shared struct without serializing
a big object graph. Finally, RLBox provides helper APIs to
mitigate double fetches [46, 61] when accessing this data.
I Assist with code migration: Compile-time type and inter-
face errors (§5) guide the developer through the process
of migrating a library into a sandbox. Each compile error
points to the next required code change—e.g., data that
needs to be validated before use, or control transfer code
that needs to be changed to use RLBox APIs.
I Bridge machine models: Sandboxing mechanisms can
have a different machine model from the application (e.g.,
both Native Client and WebAssembly use 32-bit pointers
and 32-bit longs regardless of the platform); by intercept-
ing all data and control flow we can also automatically
translate between the application and sandbox machine
models—and for Wasm we do this (§9).
In the rest of this section, we discuss how tainting is used to
mediate data flow (§4.2) and control flow (§4.4). We then
describe how the renderer can validate and untaint data (§4.3).
We detail our implementation as a C++ library later (§6.1).
4.2 Data flow safety
All data originating from a sandbox begins life tainted.
Tainting is automatically applied by wrapping data with
the tainted<T> constructor. Tainting does not change the
memory layout of a value, only its type. Once applied,
though, tainting cannot be removed. The only way to remove
a taint is through explicit validation (§4.3).
In general, RLBox propagates taint following a standard
IFC discipline. For example, we propagate taint to any data
derived from tainted values such as data accessed through
a tainted pointer, or arithmetic operations when one or more
operands are tainted. We detail how RLBox implements
tainted types and taint tracking in the C++ type system in
Section 6.1. In the rest of this section we show how RLBox
uses tainting to ensure data flow safety.
Data flow into the renderer. To protect the renderer from
malicious inputs, all data flows from the sandbox into the
renderer are tainted. Data primarily flows out of the sandbox
through two interfaces. First, sandbox_invoke(), the only
way to call into the sandbox, taints its return value. Second,
the use of sandbox_callback(), which permits callbacks
into the renderer from the sandbox, statically forces the
parameters of callbacks to be tainted. Any code failing to
follow either of these rules would cause a compilation error.
As an example, consider the JPEG decoder code that calls
libjpeg’s jpeg_read_header() to parse headers shown below:
jpeg_decompress_struct mInfo;
int status = jpeg_read_header(&mInfo, TRUE);
With RLBox, the second line must be modified to use
sandbox_invoke(), and status must be declared as tainted6:
tainted<int> status = sandbox_invoke(mRLBox,
jpeg_read_header, &mInfo, TRUE);↪→
In addition to the invoke and callback interfaces, data can
flow into the renderer via pointers to sandboxed memory.
RLBox, however, forces both these pointers and any data
derived from them (e.g., via pointer arithmetic or pointer
dereferencing) to be tainted—and, as we discuss shortly,
using tainted pointers in the renderer is always safe.
Data flow into the sandbox. RLBox requires data flowing
into sandbox from the renderer to either have a simple nu-
meric type or a tainted type. Untainted pointers, i.e., pointers
into renderer memory, are not permitted. This restriction
enforces a code correctness requirement—sandboxed code
only gets pointers it can access, i.e., pointers into sandbox
memory—and, moreover, preserves the renderer’s ASLR:
any accidental pointer leaks are eliminated by construction.
Compile-time errors are used to guide the code changes
necessary to use a sandboxed library. To demonstrate this,
we continue with the example of JPEG header parsing
6 In this paper, we use full type names such as tainted<int> for
clarity. In practice, we use C++’s auto keyword to make code less verbose.
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shown above. To start, note that the TRUE parameter to
jpeg_read_header() can remain unchanged as it has a sim-
ple numeric type (in C++). On the other hand, the parameter
&mInfo points to a struct in renderer memory, which libjpeg
cannot access; RLBox thus raises a compile-time error.
To address this compilation error, RLBox requires such
shared data structures to be allocated in sandbox memory
using sandbox_malloc():
tainted<jpeg_decompress_struct*> p_mInfo
= sandbox_malloc<jpeg_decompress_struct>(mRLBox);↪→
tainted<int> status = sandbox_invoke(mRLBox,
jpeg_read_header, p_mInfo, TRUE);↪→
Placing shared data structures in sandboxed memory in this
way simplifies data marshaling of pointer parameters during
function calls—RLBox simply marshals pointers as numeric
types, it does not eagerly copy objects. Indeed, this design
allows RLBox to automatically generate the marshaling code
without any user annotations or pointer bounds information
(as required by most RPC-based sandboxing tools). More-
over, RLBox can do all of this without compromising the
renderer’s safety—renderer code can only access shared
sandbox memory via tainted pointers.
While RLBox does not allow passing untainted point-
ers into libjpeg, pointers to callback functions, such as
fill_input_buffer(), need to be shared with the sandbox—
these can be shared either as function call parameters to libjpeg
functions, return values from callbacks, or by directly writing
to sandbox memory. RLBox permits this without exposing the
raw callback pointers to libjpeg, through a level of indirection:
trampoline functions. Specifically, RLBox automatically
replaces each Firefox callback passed to libjpeg with a pointer
to a trampoline function and tracks the mapping between
the two. When the trampoline function is invoked, RLBox
invokes the appropriate Firefox callback on libjpeg’s behalf.
Benefits of tainted pointers. By distinguishing pointers to
renderer memory from pointers to sandbox memory at the
type level with tainted, RLBox can automatically enforce
several important security requirements and checks. First,
RLBox does not permit Firefox to pass untainted pointers
to libjpeg. Second, RLBox automatically swizzles and
unswizzles pointers appropriately when pointers cross the
renderer-library boundary, including pointers in deeply nested
data structures. (We give a more detailed treatment of pointer
swizzling in Appendix A.) Third, RLBox automatically
applies pointer-bounds sanitization checks when tainted
pointers are created to ensure they always point to sandboxed
memory. Together, these properties ensure that we preserve
the renderer’s ASLR—any accidental pointer leaks are
eliminated by construction—and that the renderer cannot be
compromised by unsanitized pointers—all tainted pointers
point to sandbox memory.
4.3 Data validation
RLBox disallows computations (e.g., branching) on tainted
data that could affect the renderer control and data flow. The
Firefox renderer, however, sometimes needs to use data pro-
duced by library code. To this end, RLBox allows developers
to unwrap tainted values, i.e., convert a tainted<T> to an
untainted T, using validation methods. A validation method
takes a closure (C++ lambda) that unwraps the tainted type
by performing necessary safety checks and returning the
untainted result. Unfortunately, it is still up to the user to get
these checks correct; RLBox just makes this task easier.
RLBox simplifies the burden on the developer by
offering different types of validation functions. The first,
verify(verify_fn), validates simple tainted value types
that have already been copied to renderer memory (e.g.,
simple values), as shown in this example:
tainted<int> status = sandbox_invoke(mRLBox,
jpeg_read_header, p_mInfo, TRUE);↪→
int untaintedStatus = status.verify([](int val){
if (val == JPEG_SUSPENDED ||
val == JPEG_HEADER_TABLES_ONLY ||
val == JPEG_HEADER_OK ) { return val; }
else { /* DIE! */ }
});
if (untaintedStatus == JPEG_SUSPENDED) { ... }
Not all tainted data lives in renderer memory, though.
Validating shared tainted data structures that live in
sandbox memory is unsafe: a concurrent sandbox thread
can modify data after it’s checked and before it’s used. The
copyAndVerify(verify_fn, arg) validator addresses this by
copying its arguments into renderer memory before invoking
the verify_fn closure. To prevent subtle bugs where a
verify() function is accidentally applied to data in shared
memory, RLBox issues a compile-time error—notifying the
developer that copyAndVerify() is needed instead.
The unsafeUnverified() function removes tainting with-
out any checks. This obviously requires care, but has several
legitimate uses. For example, when migrating a codebase
to use sandboxing, using unsafeUnverified() allows us to
incrementally test our code before all validation closures
have been written (§5). Furthermore, unsafeUnverified() is
sometimes safe and necessary for performance—e.g., passing
a buffer of libjpeg-decoded pixel data to the Firefox renderer
without copying it out of sandbox memory. This is safe as
pixel data is simple byte arrays that do not require complex
decoding.
Validation in the presence of double fetches. Though our
safe validation functions ensure that sandbox code cannot
concurrently alter the data being validated, in practice we
must also account for double fetch vulnerabilities.
Consider, for example, migrating the following snippet
from the nsJPEGDecoder::OutputScanlines function:
1 while (mInfo.output_scanline < mInfo.output_height) {
2 ...
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3 imageRow = reinterpret_cast<uint32_t*>(mImageData) +
4 ↪→(mInfo.output_scanline * mInfo.output_width);
5 ...
6 }
Here, mInfo is a structure that lives in the sandbox shared
memory. Buffer imageRow is a pointer to a decoded pixel-row
that Firefox hands off to the rendering pipeline and thus must
not be tainted. To modify this code, we must validate the
results on lines 1 and 4 which are tainted as they rely on
mInfo. Unfortunately, validation is complicated by the double
fetch: a concurrent sandbox thread could change the value of
output_scanline between its check on line 1 and its use on
line 4, for example. Unsafely handling validation would allow
the sandbox to control the value of imageRow (the destination
buffer) and thus perform arbitrary out-of-bounds writes.
We could address this by copying output_scanline to a
local variable, validating it once, and using the validated
value on both lines. But, it’s not always this easy—in our port
of Firefox we found numerous instances of multiple reads,
interspersed with writes, spread across different functions.
Using local variables quickly became intractable.
To address this, RLBox provides a freeze() method on
tainted variables and struct fields. Internally, this method
makes a copy of the value into renderer memory and ensures
that the original value (which lives in sandbox memory),
when used, has not changed. To prevent accidental misuse
of freezable variables, RLBox disallows the renderer from
reading freezable variables and fields until they are frozen.
RLBox does, however, allow renderer code to write to frozen
variables—an operation that modifies the original value and
its copy. Finally, the unfreeze() method is used to restore
the sandbox’s write access.
Unlike most other RLBox features, ensuring that a variable
remains frozen imposes some runtime overhead. This is
thus a compile-time, opt-in feature that is applied to select
variables and struct fields.
Writing validators. We identify two primary styles of
writing validators in our porting Firefox to use sandboxed
libraries: we can focus on either preserving application
invariants or on preserving library invariants when crossing
the trust boundary. We demonstrate these two alternate styles,
using the above OutputScanlines example.
1. Maintaining application invariants: The first focuses on
invariants expected by Firefox. To do this, we observe
that imageRow is a pointer into the mImageData buffer and
is used as a destination to write one row of pixels. Thus,
it is sufficient to ensure that the result of output_scanline
* output_width is between 0 and mImageDataSize -
rowSize. This means that the imageRow pointer has room
for at least one row of pixels.
2. Checking library invariants: The second option focuses
on invariants provided by libjpeg. This option assumes
that the Firefox decoder behaves correctly when libjpeg
is well-behaved. Hence, we only need to ensure that
libjpeg adheres to its specification. In our example, the
libjpeg specification states that output_scanline is at
most the height of the image: we thus only need to freeze
output_scanline and then validate it accordingly.
4.4 Control flow safety
As discussed in Section 3, a malicious sandbox could attempt
to manipulate renderer control flow in several ways. While
data attacks on control flow are prevented by tainting (e.g.,
it’s not possible to branch on a tainted variable), supporting
callbacks requires additional support.
Control transfers via callbacks. It’s unsafe to allow
sandboxes to callback arbitrary functions in the renderer. It’s
also important to ensure they can only call functions which
use tainted appropriately. Thus, RLBox forces application
developers—via compile-time errors—to explicitly register
callbacks using the sandbox_callback() function. For
instance, line 8 in Figure 1, must be rewritten to:
mSourceMgr.fill_input_buffer
= sandbox_callback(mRLBox,fill_input_buffer);↪→
Statically whitelisting callbacks alone is insufficient—an
attacker-controlled sandbox could still corrupt or hijack the
control flow of the renderer by invoking callbacks at unex-
pected times. To address this class of attacks, RLBox supports
unregistering callbacks with the unregister() method. More-
over, the framework provides RAII (resource acquisition is
initialization) [54] semantics for callback registration, which
allows useful code patterns such as automatically unregister-
ing callbacks after completion of an invoked libjpeg function.
To deal with callback state exchange attacks (§3), RLBox
raises a compile-time error when renderer pointers leak
into the sandbox. For example, the JPEG decoder saves
its instance pointer with libjpeg and retrieves it in the
fill_input_buffer() callback, as shown on line 37 of
Figure 1. RLBox requires the application developer to
store such callback state in the application’s thread local
storage (TLS) instead of passing it to libjpeg. Thus, when
fill_input_buffer() is invoked, it simply retrieves the
decoder instance from the TLS, preventing any pointer leaks
or callback state modifications.
Non-local control transfers. A final, but related concern is
protecting control flow via setjmp()/longjmp(). These func-
tions are used for exception handling (e.g., my_error_exit()
in Figure 1). They work like a non-local goto, storing
various registers and CPU state in a jmp_buf on setjmp()
and restoring them on longjmp().
Naively porting libjpeg and libpng would store jmp_buf in
sandboxed memory. Unfortunately, this doesn’t work—there
is no easy way to validate a jmp_buf that is portable across
different platforms. We thus instead place such sensitive
state in the renderer’s TLS and avoid validation altogether.
With libjpeg this is straightforward since the jmp_buf is only
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used in the my_error_exit() callback. libpng, however, calls
longjmp() itself. Since we can’t expose longjmp() directly,
when sandboxing libpng, we expose a longjmp() trampoline
function that calls back to the renderer and invokes longjmp()
on libpng’s behalf, using the jmp_buf stored in the TLS.
5 Simplifying migration
RLBox simplifies migrating renderer code to use sandboxed
libraries while enforcing appropriate security checks. RLBox
does this by removing error-prone glue code (e.g., for data
marshaling) and by reducing the security-sensitive code
required for migration. The resulting reduction in developer
effort is evaluated in detail in Section 7.3.
The RLBox framework helps automate porting by (1)
allowing Firefox developers to incrementally port application
code—the entire application compiles and runs with full
functionality (passing all tests) between each step of porting—
and (2) guiding the porting effort with compiler errors which
highlight what the next step should be. We illustrate how
RLBox minimizes engineering effort using this incremental,
compiler-directed approach using our running example.
To start, we assume a standard Firefox build that uses a
statically linked libjpeg.
Step 1 (creating the sandbox). We start using RLBox by
creating a sandbox for libjpeg using the None sandboxing
architecture. As the name suggests, this sandbox does not
provide isolation; instead it redirects all function calls back to
the statically linked, unsandboxed libjpeg. However, RLBox
still fully enforces all of its type-level guarantees such as
tainting untrusted data. Thus, we can start using RLBox
while still passing functional tests.
Step 2 (splitting data and control flow). Next, we migrate
each function call to libjpeg to use the sandbox_invoke()
API. RLBox flags calls passing pointers to the sandbox as
compile-time errors after this conversion, as the sandbox will
be unable to access the (application) memory being pointed
to. To resolve this, we also convert the allocations of objects
being passed to libjpeg to instead use sandbox_malloc(). For
example, in Section 3, we rewrote:
tainted<int> status = sandbox_invoke(mRLBox,
jpeg_read_header, &mInfo, TRUE);↪→
to, instead, allocate the mInfo object in the sandbox:
tainted<jpeg_decompress_struct*> p_mInfo =
sandbox_malloc<jpeg_decompress_struct>(mRLBox);
tainted<int> status = sandbox_invoke(mRLBox,
jpeg_read_header, p_mInfo, TRUE);↪→
At this point, we need to re-factor the rest of this function
and several other JPEG decoder functions—mInfo is a data
member of the nsJPEGDecoder class. Doing this in whole is
exhausting and error-prone. Instead, we remove the mInfo
data member and add one extra line of code in each member
function before mInfo is first used:
jpeg_decompress_struct&
mInfo = *(p_mInfo.unsafeUnverified());↪→
This unsafe alias pattern allows the remainder of the function
body to run unmodified, i.e., the alias defined in this pattern
can be used everywhere the original mInfo variable is
needed, albeit unsafely, as unsafeUnverified() temporarily
suppresses the need for validation functions.
We also need to deal with return values from
sandbox_invoke() which are tainted, either by writ-
ing validation functions to remove the taint or deferring this
till the next step and using unsafeUnverified() to satisfy
the type checker. Again, the entire application should now
compile and run as normal.
Step 3 (hardening the boundary). Our next goal is to grad-
ually remove all instances of the unsafe alias pattern, moving
Firefox to a point where all data from the sandbox shared
memory and all tainted return values are handled safely.
We can do this incrementally, checking our work as we go
by ensuring the application still compiles and runs without
errors. To do this, we simply move each unsafe-alias pattern
downwards in the function source; as it moves below a given
statement, that statement is no longer able to use the alias and
must be converted to use the actual tainted value. This may
involve writing validation functions, registering callbacks,
or nothing (e.g., for operations which are safe to perform on
tainted values). We can compile and test the application after
any or all such moves. At the end, shared data is allocated
appropriately, and all tainted values should be validated—no
instances of unsafeUnverified() should remain.
Step 4 (enabling enforcement). Our final task is to replace
the None sandbox with one that enforces strong isolation. To
start, we remove the statically-linked libjpeg and change the
sandbox type from None to None_DynLib. In contrast to the
None sandbox, the None_DynLib sandbox dynamically loads
libjpeg. Any remaining calls to libjpeg made without the
sandbox_invoke() will fail with a symbol resolution error
at compile time. We resolve these and finish by changing
the sandbox type to Process, NaCl sandbox types that enforce
isolation. We discuss these isolation mechanisms in more
detail in Section 6.2.
6 Implementation
Our implementation consists of two components: (1) a C++
library that exposes the APIs that developers use when
sandboxing a third-party library, and (2) two isolation mech-
anisms that offer different scaling-performance trade-offs.
We describe both of these below, and also describe a third
approach in Section 9.
6.1 RLBox C++ API and type system
The RLBox API is implemented largely as a pure C++ library.
This library consists of functions like sandbox_invoke() that
are used to safely transfer control between the application
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and library. These functions return tainted values and
can only be called with tainted values or primitives. The
library’s wrapped types (e.g., tainted<T>) are used to
ensure dataflow safety (e.g., when using a value returned
by sandbox_invoke()). Since the implementation of the
control flow functions is mostly standard, we focus on our
implementation of tainted values.
The tainted<T> wrapper. We implement tainted<T> as
a simple wrapper that preserves the memory layout of the
unwrapped T value, i.e., tainted<int> is essentially struct
tainted<int> { int val; }. The only distinction be-
tween tainted and untainted values is at the type-level. In
particular, we define methods and operators on tainted<T>
values that (1) ensure that tainted values cannot be used
where untainted values are expected (e.g., branch conditions)
without validation and (2) allow certain computations on
tainted data by ensuring their results are themselves tainted.
In general, we cannot prevent developers from deliberately
abusing unsafe C++ constructs (e.g., reinterpret_cast)
to circumvent our wrappers. Our implementation, however,
guards against common C++ design patterns that could
inadvertently break our tainted abstraction. For example,
we represent tainted pointers as tainted<T*> and not
tainted<T> *. This ensures that developers cannot write
code that inadvertently unwraps tainted pointers via pointer
decay—since all C++ pointers can decay to void*. We also
use template meta-programming and SFINAE to express
more complex type-level policies. For example, we disallow
calls to verify() on pointer types and ensure that callback
functions have wrapped all parameters in tainted.
Operators on tainted data. For flexibility, we define
several operators on tainted types. Operations which are
always safe, such as the assignment (operator=) of a
tainted<int>, simply forward the operation to the wrapped
int. Other operators, however, require return types to be
tainted. Still others require runtime checks. We give a few
illustrative examples.
I Wrapping returned values: We allow arithmetic oper-
ators (e.g., operator+) on, say, tainted<int>s, or a
tainted<int> and an untainted int, but wrap the return
value.
I Runtime checks: We allow array indexing with both ints
and tainted<int>s by defining a custom array indexing
operator operator[]. This operator performs a runtime
check to ensure the array indexing is within sandbox
memory.
I Pointer swizzling: We also allow operations such as
operator=, operator*, and operator-> on tainted
pointers, but ensure that the operators account for swizzling
(in addition to the runtime bounds check) when performing
these operations. As with the others, these operators return
tainted values. In Appendix A, we describe the subtle
details of type-driven automatic pointer swizzling.
Wrapped structs. Our library can automatically wrap prim-
itive types, pointer types, function pointers, and static array
types. It cannot, however, wrap arbitrary user-defined structs
without some added boilerplate definitions. This is because
C++ (as of C++17) does not yet support reflection on struct
field names. We thus built a ~100LOC Clang plugin that auto-
matically generates a header file containing the required boil-
erplate for all struct types defined in the application source.
Other wrapped types. In addition to the tainted wrapper
type, RLBox also relies on several other types for both safety
and convenience. As an example of safety, our framework
distinguishes registered callbacks from other function point-
ers, at the type level. In particular, sandbox_callback returns
values of type callback<...>. This allows us to ensure
that functions that expect callbacks as arguments can in fact
only be called with callbacks that have been registered with
sandbox_callback. As an example of convenience, RLBox
provides RAII types such as stack_arr<T> and heap_arr<T>
which minimize boilerplate. With these types, developers
can for instance invoke a function with an inline string:
sandbox_invoke(sbox, png_error, stack_arr("...")).
6.2 Efficient isolation mechanisms
The RLBox API provides a plugin approach to support
different, low-level sandboxing mechanisms. We describe two
sandboxing mechanisms which allow portable and efficient
solutions for isolating libraries in this section. In Section 9
we describe a third mechanism, based on WebAssembly, that
we recently integrated in production Firefox.
The first mechanism uses software-based fault isolation
(SFI) [59] extending Google’s Native Client (NaCl) [48, 64],
while the second uses OS processes with a combination
of mutexes and spinlocks to achieve performance. These
approaches and trade-offs are described in detail below.
SFI using NaCl. SFI uses inline dynamic checks to restrict
the memory addressable by a library to a subset of the address
space, in effect isolating a library from the rest of an appli-
cation within a single process. SFI scales to many sandboxes,
has predictable performance, and incurs low overhead for
context switching (as isolation occurs within a single process).
The low context-switch overhead (about 10× a normal
function call) is critical for the performance of streaming
libraries such as libjpeg, which tend to have frequent control
transfers. We explore this in more detail later (§7).
To support library sandboxing with SFI, we extend the
NaCl compiler toolchain [48, 64]. NaCl was originally
designed for sandboxing mobile code in the browser, not
library sandboxing. Hence, we made significant changes
to the compiler, optimization passes, ELF loader, machine
model and runtime; we give a thorough description of these
changes in Appendix B. To ensure that our changes do not
affect security, we always verify the code produced by our
toolchain with the unmodified NaCl binary code verifier.
We use our modified NaCl compiler toolchain to compile
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libraries like libjpeg along with a custom runtime component.
This runtime component provides symbol resolution and
facilitates communication with the renderer.
Process sandboxing. Process sandboxing works by isolating
a library in a separate sandbox process whose access to the
system call interface is restricted using seccomp-bpf [33].
We use shared memory between the two processes to pass
function arguments and to allocate shared objects. Compared
to SFI, process sandboxing is simpler and does not need
custom compiler toolchains. When used carefully, it can even
provide performance comparable to SFI (§7).
As with SFI, process sandboxing also includes a custom
runtime that handles communication between the library and
renderer. Unlike SFI, though, this communication is a control
transfer that requires inter-process synchronization. Unfortu-
nately, using a standard synchronization mechanism—notably,
condition variables—is not practical: a simple cross-process
function is over 300× slower than a normal function call.
Our process sandbox uses both spinlocks and condition
variables, allowing users to switch between to address
application needs. Spinlocks offer low control-transfer
latency (20× a normal function call), at the cost of contention
and thus scalability. Condition variables have higher latency
(over 300× a normal function call), but minimize contention
and are thus more scalable. In the next section we detail our
Firefox integration and describe how we switch between
these two process sandboxing modes.
6.3 Integrating RLBox with Firefox
To use the SFI or Process sandbox mechanisms efficiently
in Firefox, we must make several policy decisions about
when to create and destroy sandboxes, how many sandboxes
to keep alive, and for the Process sandbox when to switch
synchronization modes. We describe these below.
Creating and destroying sandboxes. We build Firefox
with RLBox sandboxing web page decompression, image
decoding, and audio and video playback. We apply a simple
policy of creating a sandbox on demand—a fresh sandbox is
required when decoding a resource with a unique <renderer,
library, content-origin, content-type> as discussed
in Section 2. We lazily destroy unused sandboxes once
we exceed a fixed threshold. We determine this threshold
experimentally. Most webpages have a large number of
compressed media files as compared to the number of images
(§7.1). Since we can only reasonably scale to 250 sandboxes
(§7.5.3), we conservatively use a threshold 10 sandboxes
for JPEG and PNG image decoding, and 50 sandboxes for
webpage decompression. Browsers do not typically play mul-
tiple audio or video content simultaneously—we thus simply
create a fresh sandbox for each audio and video file that must
be decoded and destroy the sandbox immediately after.
Switching synchronization modes. For the Process sand-
box, we switch between spinlocks and conditional variables
according to two policies. First, we use spinlocks when the
renderer performs a latency sensitive task, such as decoding
an image using a series of synchronous libjpeg function
calls and callbacks. But, when the renderer requests more
input data, we switch to the condition variables; spinlocks
would create needless CPU contention while waiting for
this data (often from the network). Second, for large media
decoding such as 4K images, we use condition variables:
each function call to the sandbox process takes a large
amount of time (relative to the context switch) to perform
part of the decoding. Though we can use more complex
policies (e.g., that take load into effect), we find these two
simple policies to perform relatively well (§7).
Leveraging multiple cores. Since 95% of devices that run
Firefox have more than 1 core, we can use multiple cores to
optimize our sandbox performance.7 In particular, our pro-
cess sandbox implementation pins the sandboxed process on
a separate CPU core from the renderer process to avoid unnec-
essary context switches between the renderer and sandboxed
process. This is particularly important when using spinlocks
since the sandbox process’s spinlock takes CPU cycles even
when “not in use”; pinning this process to a separate core en-
sures that the sandbox process does not degrade the renderer
performance. In our evaluation (§7), we reserve one of the sys-
tem’s cores exclusively for the processes created by our sand-
boxing mechanism, when comparing against the stock and SFI
builds (which use all cores for the renderer process’ threads).
7 Evaluation
We present the following results:
I Cross origin resources that could compromise the renderer
are pervasive, and could even be used to compromise web-
sites like Gmail. We present measurements of their preva-
lence in the Alexa top 500 websites in section 7.1.
I Library sandboxing overheads are modest: section 7.2
breaks down the individual sources of sandboxing over-
head, section 7.4, shows end-to-end page latencies and
memory overheads for popular websites are modest with
both isolation mechanisms(§6.2)–even on media heavy
websites, section 7.5, shows that the CPU overhead of web
page decompression and image decoding in the renderer
process are modest, and that CPU and memory overheads
scale well up to our current maximum of 250 concurrent
sandboxes.
I Migrating a library into RLBox typically takes a few days
with modest effort, as shown in Section 7.3.
I RLBox is broadly useful for library sandboxing beyond
Firefox, as demonstrated in 7.6, where we discuss our
experience apply RLBox to sandboxing native libraries in
Apache and Node.js modules.
Machine Setup. All benchmarks run on an Intel i7-6700K
7See https://data.firefox.com/dashboard/hardware, last visited
May 15, 2019.
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Figure 2: Cross-origin resource inclusion in the Alexa Top-500.
(4 GHz) machine with 64 GB of RAM, and hyperthreading
disabled, running 64-bit Ubuntu 18.04.1. Firefox builds run
pinned on two isolated CPU cores (i.e., no other process is
allowed to run on these CPUs), to reduce noise. As discussed
in Section 6.3, with the process sandbox build, the renderer
process is pinned to one core, while the sandbox process uses
the other core.
7.1 Cross-origin content inclusion
To evaluate how often web sites include content (e.g., images,
audio, and videos) cross-origin, we crawled the Alexa top 500
websites. Our crawler—a simple Firefox extension—logs all
cross-origin resource requests made by the website for 10
seconds after page load (allowing some dynamic content to
be loaded). Figure 2 shows our measurements, categorized
by the resource MIME type.
We find that 93% of the sites load at least one cross-origin
media resource (primarily images), with mean of 48 and
median of 30, cross-origin media resources loaded. Many
of the resource loads (median 35 and mean 17) are not just
cross-origin but also cross-site. In the presence of media
parsing library bugs, such loads would undermine Site
Isolation protections.
The pervasive use of cross-origin resources inclusion
indicates that sandboxing libraries at the <renderer,
library, content-origin, content-type> granularity can
significantly reduce the renderer attack surface. Although not
all cross-origin content is necessarily untrusted, the origin
is nevertheless an important trust boundary in practice—and
many websites do consider cross-origin media untrusted.
For instance, Google allows users to freely upload content
to sites.google.com, but serves such media content from
googleusercontent.com. Google even re-encodes images,
another sign that such images are untrusted.
Unfortunately, they do not re-encode video or audio files.
To test this, we created a page on sites.google.com in
which we embedded both the VPX video proof of concept
exploit of CVE-2015-4506 [10] and the OGG audio proof
of concept exploit of CVE-2018-5148 [11]. In both cases the
files were unmodified. For VPX, we modified Firefox and
Chrome (with Site Isolation) to re-introduce the VPX bug
and visited our malicious website: in both browsers the video
successfully triggered the bug.
We found we could include such malicious content as part
of an email to a Gmail address. Gmail re-encodes images,
but does not re-encode the video and audio files. The Gmail
preview feature even allows us to play the audio track—which
surprisingly, we found was hosted on mail.google.com.
7.2 Baseline RLBox overhead
To understand the overhead of different parts of the
RLBox framework in isolation we perform several
micro-benchmarks.
Sandbox creation overhead. The overhead of sandbox
creation is ≈1ms for SFI sandboxes and ≈2ms for process
sandboxes. These overheads do not affect page latency for
any realistic website, and can be hidden by pre-allocating
sandboxes in a pool. For this reason, we don’t include
sandbox creation time in the remaining measurements.
Control transfer overhead. To understand the overhead
of a control transfer, we measure the elapsed time for an
empty function call with different isolation mechanisms. For
reference, an empty function call without sandboxing takes
about 0.02µs in our setup. With sandboxing, we measured
this to be 0.22µs for SFI sandboxes, 0.47µs for Process
sandboxes using spinlocks, and 7.4µs for Process sandboxes
using conditional variables. SFI and Process sandboxes using
spinlocks are an order of magnitude slower than a normal
function call, but over 10× faster than Processes using
condition variables, and are thus better suited for workloads
with frequent control transfers.
Overhead of RLBox dynamic checks. The RLBox API in-
troduces small overheads with its safety checks (e.g., pointer
bounds checks, swizzling, and data validation functions). To
measure these, we compare the overhead of rendering .jpeg
and .png images on Firefox with sandboxed libraries with
and without RLBox enabled. We find the difference to be neg-
ligible (< 1%). This is unsurprising: most of RLBox’s checks
are static and our dynamic checks are lightweight masks.
Overhead of SFI dynamic checks. Unlike process-based
sandboxing, SFI incurs a baseline overhead (e.g., due to
inserted dynamic checks, padding etc.) [64]. To understand
the overhead of our NaCl SFI implementation, we implement
a small .jpeg image decoding program and measure its
slowdown when using a sandboxed libjpeg. We find the
overhead to be roughly 22%.
7.3 Migrating Firefox to use RLBox
In this section, we evaluate the developer effort required to
migrate Firefox to use sandboxed libraries. In particular, we
report the manual effort required by RLBox developers and
the manual effort saved by using the RLBox API. Figure 3
gives a breakdown of the effort. On average, we find that it
takes a bit over two days to sandbox a library with RLBox
and roughly 180 LOC (25% code increase); much of this
effort is mechanical (following Section 5).
Figure 3 also shows the tasks that RLBox automates away.
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Task JPEGDecoder
PNG
Decoder
GZIP
Decompress
Theora
Decoder
VPX
Decoder
OGG-Vorbis
Decoder
Effort saved by
RLBox automation
Generated marshaling code 133 LOC 278 LOC 38 LOC 39 LOC 60 LOC 59 LOC
Automatic pointer swizzles for function calls 30 96 5 36 46 34
Automatic nested pointer swizzles 17 5 6 8 9 5
Automatic pointer bounds checks 64 checks 25 checks 8 checks 12 checks 15 checks 14 checks
Number of validator sites found 28 51 10 5 2 4
Manual effort
Number of person-days porting to RLBox – – 1 day 3 days 3 days 2 days
Application LOC before/after port 720 / 1058 847 / 1317 649 / 757 220 / 297 286 / 368 328 / 395
Number of unique validators needed 11 14 3 3 2 2
Average LOC of validators 3 LOC 4 LOC 2 LOC 3 LOC 2 LOC 2 LOC
Figure 3: Manual effort required to retrofit Firefox with fine grain isolation, including the effort saved by RLBox’s automation. We do not
report the number of days it took to port the JPEG and PNG decoders since we ported them in sync with building RLBox.
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Figure 4: Impact of sandboxing on page load latencies and peak memory usage overheads. Firefox with SFI sandboxes incurs a 3% page
latency and 25% memory overhead while Firefox with process isolation incurs a 13% page latency and a 18% memory overhead.
First, RLBox eliminates 607 lines of glue-code needed by
both the Process and SFI sandboxes to marshal function pa-
rameters and return values for each cross-boundary function
call; RLBox automatically generates this boilerplate through
C++ templates and meta-programming. Second, RLBox auto-
matically swizzles pointers. This is necessary for any sandbox
functions or callbacks that accept pointers; it’s also necessary
when handling data-structures with nested pointers that are
shared between the application and the sandbox. This is a par-
ticularly challenging task without RLBox, as manually iden-
tifying the 297 locations where the application interacts with
such pointers would have been tedious and error-prone. Third,
RLBox automatically performs bounds checks (§4.2); the
number of required pointer bounds checks that were automat-
ically performed by RLBox are again in the hundreds (138).
Finally, RLBox identifies the (100) sites where we
must validate tainted data (§4.3). Though RLBox cannot
automate the validators, we find that we only need 35 unique
validators—all less than 4 lines of code. In practice, we
found this to be the hardest part of migration since it requires
understanding the domain-specific invariants.
7.4 RLBox overhead in Firefox
We report the end-to-end overheads of Firefox with library
sandboxing by measuring page latencies of webpages, mem-
ory overheads in Firefox as well as audio video playback rates.
Experimental setup. We evaluate end-to-end performance
with six sandboxed libraries: libjpeg-turbo 1.4.3, libpng 1.6.3,
zlib 1.2.11, libvpx 1.6.1, libtheora 1.2, and libvorbis as used
in Firefox 57.0.4. We report performance for two Firefox
builds that use libraries sandboxed with SFI and Process
mechanisms respectively. Both builds create fresh sandboxes
for each <renderer, library, origin, content-type>
combination as described in §2. We measure impact on page
load times for both these builds.
7.4.1 End-to-end impact on real-world websites
Benchmark. We report the overhead of page load latency
and memory overheads in Firefox with the six sandboxed
libraries by measuring latencies of the 11 websites used
to measure the overhead of Site Isolation [40]. These
websites are a representative sample of both popular and
slightly-less-popular websites, and many of them make
heavy use of media resources. We measure page load latency
using Firefox’s Talos test harness [32]. We measure memory
overheads with cgmemtime [45]—in particular, the peak
resident memory and cache usage during a run of Firefox.
We run the test 10 times and report the median values of page
latency and memory overheads.
Results. As shown in Figure 4, the page latency and CPU
utilization overheads are modest. Our SFI build incurs a 3%
overhead in page latency while the Process sandbox incurs
an overhead of 13%. As a comparison point, the overhead of
naively using process sandboxes (using only conditional vari-
ables without any CPU pinning) incurs an overhead of 167%.
We find the average peak renderer memory overhead
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to be 25% and 18% for the SFI and Process sandboxes,
respectively. This overhead is modest and, more importantly,
transient: we can destroy a sandbox after the media has been
decoded during page load.
7.4.2 Sandboxing video and audio decoding
To understand the performance overhead of RLBox on video
and audio decoding, we measure the performance of Firefox
when decoding media from two video formats (Theora and
VPX) and one audio format (OGG-Vorbis).
Benchmark. Our benchmark measures decoding perfor-
mance on the Sintel sequence in Xiph.org’s media test suite8.
As this sequence is saved as lossless video, we setup the bench-
mark by first converting this to ultra HD videos of 4K resolu-
tion in the Theora and VP9 formats; we similarly convert the
lossless audio to a high resolution OGG-vorbis audio file with
a sample rate of 96 kHz and a bit rate of 500 Kb/s using the
suggested settings for these formats [56, 58]. Our benchmark
then measures the frame-rate and bit-rate of the video and
audio playback—by instrumenting the decoders with timers—
when using the sandboxed libraries. We run the test 5 times
and report the median values of frame-rate and bit-rate.
Results. We find that neither the SFI nor the Process
sandboxing mechanism visibly degrades performance. In
particular, our sandboxed Firefox are able to maintain the
same frame-rate (24 fps for the VPX video and 60 fps for
the Theora video) and bit-rate (478 bits per second) as stock
Firefox for these media files.
7.5 Microbenchmarks of RLBox in Firefox
To understand the performance impact of RLBox on the
different libraries, we perform several microbenchmarks that
specifically measure the impact of sandboxing webpage de-
compression, image decoding and sandbox scaling in Firefox.
7.5.1 Sandboxing webpage decompression
Firefox uses zlib to decompress webpages. Since webpage
decompression is done entirely before the page is rendered,
we report the overhead of sandboxing zlib by measuring the
slowdown in page load time.
Benchmark. We create a webpage whose HTML content
(excluding media and scripts) is 1.8 MB, the size of an av-
erage web page9, and measure the page load time with Talos.
We use the median page load time from 1000 runs of this test.
Results. For both SFI and Process sandboxing mechanisms,
the overhead of sandboxing zlib is under 1%. In other words,
the overhead of sandboxing zlib is largely offset by other
computations needed to render a page.
8Online: https://media.xiph.org/. Last visited November 15, 2019.
9See the HTTP Archive page weight report, https://httparchive.
org/reports/page-weight. Last visited May 15, 2019.
7.5.2 Sandboxing image decoding
To understand performance impact of sandboxing on image
rendering, we measure per-image execution time for the .jpeg
and .png decoders, with different forms of sandboxing, and
compare our results to stock Firefox. Decoder execution time
is a better metric for image rendering performance than page
load time because Firefox decodes and renders images asyn-
chronously; the usual test harness would notify us that a page
has been loaded before images have actually been decoded
and displayed in full—and this might be visible to the user.
Benchmarks. We use the open Image Compression
benchmark suite10 to measure sandboxed image decoding
overheads. To capture the full range of possibilities for
performance overhead, we measure overheads of images at
3 sizes (135p, 320p, and 1280p) and three compression levels
(best, default, and none) for each image in the benchmark
suite. We run this test 4000 times for each image and compare
the median decoder code execution times.
Results. Since all images in the suite produce similar results,
we give the results of one 8-bit image in Figure 5. We start
with three high-level observations. First, both SFI and Process
based sandboxes have reasonable overheads—23-32% and
< 41% respectively for most JPEGs, 2-49% and < 15%
respectively for PNGs. Second, Process sandbox sometimes
has negative overheads. This is because the Process sandbox
dedicates one of the two available cores exclusively for
execution of sandboxed code (§6.3) including the sandboxed
image rendering code, while the stock and SFI Firefox builds
use all cores evenly. Third, for JPEGs at the best compression,
the overhead relative to stock Firefox is high—roughly 80%
for SFI and 140% for Process sandboxes. This is because
decoding high compression images have low absolute decode
times (~650µs), and thus have larger overheads as control
transfer overheads between Firefox and the sandbox image
libraries cost are not effectively amortized. However, in
absolute terms, the differences are less than 1.5ms and have
no impact on end-user experience.
7.5.3 Sandbox scaling characteristics
Web pages often contain tens of images of different types
from multiple origins. Thus, the scaling properties of different
isolation mechanisms are an important consideration.
Benchmark. We evaluate sandbox scaling by rendering
pages with an increasing number of JPEG images from unique
origins. Each image thus creates a new sandbox which incurs
both CPU and memory costs. CPU costs are measured by
measuring the total amount of time executing image decoding
functions. We measure memory overhead as before, but don’t
destroy any sandbox; this allows us to estimate the worst
case scenario where memory usage is not transient. As before
10Online: https://imagecompression.info/test_images/. Last
visited May 15, 2019.
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Figure 5: Per-image decoding overhead for images at 3 compression levels and 3 resolutions, normalized against stock Firefox. For most
JPEGs, the SFI and Process sandbox overhead is 23-32%, and < 41% respectively. For PNGs, the SFI and Process sandbox overhead is
2-49% and < 15% respectively. We also observe some negative overheads and pathological cases where overhead is as high as 140%. The
reasons for this are explained in Section 7.5.2.
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Figure 6: Performance overhead of image decoding with increasing
the number of sandboxes (each image is rendered in a fresh sandbox).
(§7.5.2), we measure the decoder execution time for 4000
image loads at each scale, and report the median overhead.
Results. Figure 6 shows the CPU overhead of image
rendering as we increase the number of sandboxes for both
large (1280p) and small (135p) JPEG images using default
compression. This experiment allows us to make several
observations. We can run up to 250 concurrent SFI sandboxes
before we run into limitations like exhausting pre-allocated
thread local storage or finding aligned free virtual memory.
These limitations can be overcome with more engineering
effort. We never came close to these limits browsing real
websites, including those of Section 7.4.1. Both the SFI and
the Process sandbox similarly scale well on both small and
large images, with CPU overheads between 20% and 40%
for most sandbox counts. The process sandbox, however,
scales only because we use multiple synchronization modes
described (§6).
Extra sandboxes add memory overhead for two reasons.
First, each sandbox uses a private copy of code (e.g., libjpeg
and libc for each libjpeg sandbox). Second, each sandbox
has its own stack and heap. In this experiment, we observed
that memory consumption increases linearly with the
number of images (which corresponds to the number of
sandboxes created). On average, an SFI sandbox consumes
1.6 MB, while Process sandboxing consumes 2.4 MB for
each sandbox. Several optimizations to reduce memory
consumption exist that we have not yet implemented. For
example, the SFI sandbox currently loads a fresh copy of the
code for each sandbox instance. We could optimize this by
sharing code pages between sandboxes—and, indeed, we do
this in production for our Wasm sandbox.
7.6 RLBox outside Firefox
RLBox is a general-purpose sandboxing framework that can
be used in any C++ application. To demonstrate its utility
beyond Firefox, we applied it in two different contexts: the
Apache web server and Node.js runtime.
Apache allows developers to write C modules that extend
its base functionality. These modules often depend on
third-party libraries. For example, the mod_markdown [31]
module uses the libmarkdown library to transform Markdown
to HTML on the fly to support serving Markdown files.
To protect Apache from bugs in libmarkdown we modify
mod_markdown to run libmarkdown in an RLBox SFI
sandbox. The change required a single person-day, and
added or modified roughly 300 lines of code. We measured
the average and tail latency as well as throughput of the
webserver using the autocannon 4.4.0 benchmarking tool [2]
with default configurations (1 minute runtime, 10 parallel
connections) serving a 16K markdown file. The unmodified
webserver’s average latency, tail latency and throughput
were 10.5ms, 36ms and 940 requests/second, respectively;
the sandboxed server’s average latency, tail latency and
throughput were 14ms, 40ms and 684 requests/second.
Though the average latency and throughput overhead is
modest, we observe that the tail latency—arguably the most
important metric—is within 10% of baseline.
Node.js is a JavaScript runtime system written in C++,
largely used for web applications. Like Apache, Node.js
allows developers to expose new functionality implemented
in native plugins to the JavaScript code. For example,
the bcrypt [37] password hashing library relies on native
code—indeed the JavaScript code largely wraps Provos’ C
bcrypt library. To protect the runtime from memory-safety
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bugs in the C library, we modify the C++ code in bcrypt to
run the bcrypt C library in an RLBox SFI sandbox—a change
that required roughly 2 person hours, adding or modifying
75 lines of code. We measured—using the benchmark.js
library—the overhead in average hashing throughput (hashing
a random 32-byte password) to be modest: 27%.
8 Related work
Isolation in the browser. Modern browsers since Chrome [3]
rely on coarse grain privilege separation [38] to prevent
browser compromises from impacting the local OS [39].
However, a compromised renderer process can still use any
credentials the browser has for other sites, enabling extremely
powerful universal cross-site scripting (UXSS) attacks [14].
In response to UXSS attacks and recent Spectre attacks,
Chrome introduced Site Isolation [40]. Site Isolation puts
pages and iframes of different sites into separate processes.
Unfortunately, as discussed in Section 1, this does not prevent
UXSS attacks across related sites (e.g., mail.google.com
and pay.google.com). Firefox’s Project Fission [34]
proposes to go further and isolate at the origin boundary,
similar to previous research browsers [18, 43, 60], but this
still does not protect the renderer when loading cross-origin
resources such as images.
An unpublished prototype using SFI called MinSFI [47]
was developed at Google in 2013 to protect the Chrome ren-
derer from compromise of zlib library; however, it was missing
several features necessary for compatibility and efficiency,
including threading and callback support. Additionally, the
project was primarily focused on improving the efficiency of
SFI rather than the integration challenges tackled by RLBox
including handling tainted data, migration of code bases, etc.
In some parts of the renderer, there is no substitute for
strong memory safety to prevent attacks. Servo [1] is an
ongoing project to rewrite much of the Firefox rendering
stack in Rust. However, for the foreseeable future, Firefox
and other browsers will continue to rely on libraries written
in C/++. This makes sandboxing the most viable approach
to containing vulnerabilities.
Sandboxing. There has been some related work on providing
APIs to simplify using sandboxed libraries (e.g., Codejail [62]
and Google Sandboxing APIs [5]). However, these efforts
do not provide the type-driven automation of RLBox (e.g.,
pointer swizzling and migration assistance) nor the safety
of tainted types—leaving developers to manually deal
with attacks of Section 3. Sammler et al. [42] formal model
addresses some of these attacks using a type-direct approach,
but require applications to be formally verified correct (in
contrast to our local validators) to give meaningful guarantees.
There is a long line of work on sandboxing mechanisms
with different performance trade-offs [20, 47, 48, 57, 59].
Recent, excellent surveys [51, 55] present a comprehensive
overview of these mechanisms. RLBox makes it easy for
developers to use such mechanisms without modifying
the application or library (§6.2). In production we use
WebAssembly; WebAssembly stands out as a principled
approach with wide adoption [20].
Data sanitization and leaks. There is a large body of work
on static and dynamic approaches to preventing or mitigating
missed sanitization errors; see the survey by Song et al. [52].
These tools are orthogonal to RLBox. Developers could use
them to check their data validation functions for bugs.
DUI Detector [22] uses runtime trace analysis to identify
missing pointer sanitizations in user code. Other work has
looked at sanitizing user pointers in the kernel [9]. For
example, type annotations [25] have been used to distinguish
between untrusted user pointers and trusted pointers in OS
kernel code. In contrast, RLBox automatically applies such
pointer sanitizations by leveraging the C++ type system.
One approach to avoid double-fetch bugs is to marshal
all shared data before using it. But, this comes at a cost.
Marshaling tools and APIs typically require array bounds an-
notations, which is tedious and demands in-depth knowledge
of the sandboxed library’s internal data structures. Automatic
marshaling tools like C-strider [44] and PtrSplit [29]
address this limitation; however, these tools either impose
a significant overhead or lack support for multi-threading.
RLBox uses shared memory and statically enforces that
shared data is placed in shared memory, avoiding the need for
custom marshaling tools or annotations. The use of shared
memory, however, introduces possible double-fetch bugs.
While RLBox provides APIs to assist with double-fetches,
the possibility of unhandled double-fetch bugs still remain.
Several recent techniques detect double-fetches from shared
memory [46, 61, 63] and can be used alongside RLBox.
Previous efforts have also sought to prevent leaking point-
ers that could compromise ASLR [6, 13, 30]. RLBox prevents
pointer leaks by disallowing pointers to renderer memory to
pass into the sandboxed library via the type system.
Porting assistance. Several privilege separation tools pro-
vide assistance when migrating to a sandboxed architecture.
Wedge (Crowbar) [4] uses dynamic analysis to guide the
migration, and also supports an incremental porting mode that
disables isolation so that developers can test the partial port
and identify the next step. SOAAP [19] uses code annotations
and a custom compiler to guide the developer. PrivTrans [8]
uses code annotations and automatic source code rewriting to
separate code and data into separate components. In contrast,
RLBox assists with porting without any custom tooling,
purely through the use of compile-time errors, by identifying
code that must be modified for security and shared data that
must be migrated to sandbox memory (§5).
9 Using RLBox in production
Over the last 6 months we’ve been integrating RLBox into
production Firefox. In this section, we describe the difference
between our research prototype and the production RLBox,
and our migration of the libGraphite font shaping library to
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use RLBox. We are in the process of migrating several other
libraries and adding support for Firefox on Windows [15, 50].
9.1 Making RLBox production-ready
To make RLBox production-ready we adapt a new isolation
mechanism based on WebAssembly and rewrite the RLBox
API, using our prototype implementation as a reference.
SFI using WebAssembly. In production, we use Wasm
instead of NaCl to isolate library code from the rest of Firefox
within a single process. Though Wasm’s performance and
feature-set is not yet on par with NaCl’s [23], NaCl has been
deprecated in favor of Wasm [17] and maintaining a separate
toolchain for library sandboxing is prohibitive. Moreover,
these limitations are likely to disappear soon: as part of the
Bytecode Alliance, multiple companies are working together
to build robust Wasm compilation toolchains, a standard
syscall interface, SIMD extensions, etc.
Since our goal is to reap the benefits of these efforts,
we need to minimize the changes to these toolchains. In
particular, this means that we cannot adjust for differences
between the Firefox and Wasm machine model as we did
for NaCl [35]—by intrusively modifying the compiler,
loader, runtime, etc. (§6.2). We, instead, take advantage
of the fact that RLBox intercepts all data and control flow
to automatically translate between the Firefox and Wasm
machine models in the RLBox API.
Our only modification to the Lucet Wasm runtime is an opti-
mized trampoline, which we are working on upstreaming [66].
Since Wasm is well-typed and has deterministic seman-
tics, our trampolines safely eliminate the context-and stack-
switching code, reducing the cost of a cross-boundary cross-
ing to a function call. This optimization was key to our ship-
ping the sandboxed libGraphite (§5)—it reduced the overhead
of RLBox by 800%. The details and formalization of these
zero-cost trampolines will be presented in a separate paper.
Meaningful migration error-messages. We re-implement
RLBox in C++ 17 and use new features—in particular if
constexpr—to customize the error messages that guide
developers during migration (§5). Meaningful error messages
(as opposed to a wall of generic, template failures) is key
to making RLBox usable to other developers. Although
implementing custom error messages in our C++ 11 prototype
is possible, it would make the implementation drastically
more complex; C++ 17 allows us to keep the RLBox API
implementation concise (under 3K lines of code) and give
meaningful error messages.
9.2 Isolating libGraphite
We use RLBox to isolate the libGraphite font shaping library,
creating a fresh sandbox for each Graphite font instance. We
choose libGraphite largely because the Graphite fonts are not
widely used on the web, but nevertheless Firefox needs to
support it for web compatibility. This means that the library is
part of Firefox attack surface—and thus memory safety bugs
in libGraphite are security vulnerabilities in Firefox [53, 65].
Evaluation To measure the overhead of our sandboxing,
we use a micro-benchmark that measures the page render
time when reflowing text in a Graphite font ten times,
adjusting the font size each time, so font caches aren’t used.11
We find that Wasm sandboxing imposes a 85% overhead on
the libGraphite code, which in turn slows down Firefox’s font
rendering component (which uses libGraphite internally) by
50%. We attribute this slowdown largely to the nascent Wasm
toolchains, which don’t yet support performance optimization
on par with, say LLVM [21, 23]. Nevertheless, this overhead
is not user-perceptible; in practice page rendering is slowed
down due to the network and heavy media content, not fonts.
To measure memory overhead, we use cgmemtime to
capture the peak resident memory and cache used by Firefox
on the same micro-benchmark. We find the memory overhead
to be negligible—the median peak memory overhead when
loading the micro-benchmark ten times is 0.68% (peak
memory use went from 431460 KB to 434426 KB).
Deployment. The rewritten RLBox library as well as the
modifications to Firefox to use a sandbox libGraphite have
been merged into the Firefox code base [50]. Our retrofitted
Firefox successfully tested on both the Firefox Nightly and
Beta channels, and ships in stock Firefox 74 to Linux users
and in Firefox 75 to Mac users [15].
10 Conclusion
Third party libraries are likely to remain a significant source of
critical browser vulnerabilities. Our approach to sandboxing
code at the library-renderer interface offers a practical path to
mitigating this threat in Firefox, and other browsers as well.
RLBox shows how a type-driven approach can significantly
ease the burden of securely sandboxing libraries in existing
code, through a combination of static information flow
enforcement, dynamic checks, and validations. RLBox is
not dependent on Firefox and is useful as a general purpose
sandboxing framework for other C++ applications.
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A Automated Pointer Swizzling
Applications represent pointers as full 64-bit addresses (on 64-
bit systems), however sandboxes such as the NaCl and Wasm
SFI sandboxes, represents pointers as 32-bit offsets from the
sandbox base address. Thus pointers must be swizzled to share
data structures between the application and sandboxed library.
The tainted_volatile type. To automate pointer
swizzling, RLBox internally adds an additional type,
tainted_volatile, that it uses when dereferencing a tainted
pointer. Like tainted wrappers, the tainted_volatile
wrapper also refers to data from the sandboxed library,
with the distinction that tainted_volatile data is stored in
sandbox memory (memory accessible by sandboxed code)
rather than application memory. These tainted_volatile
types are primarily used as rvalue types and automatically
convert into tainted types when copied into application
memory, meaning that the programmer would never create
a variable of tainted_volatile type and need not know
of the type’s existence. Distinguishing between tainted
and tainted_volatile types allow RLBox to automate
swizzling. By inspecting types, RLBox can swizzle pointers
appropriately any time we write tainted pointer to a
tainted_volatile location or vice-versa.
Context free swizzling. A further complication of imple-
menting pointer swizzling is that RLBox needs to swizzle
pointers without knowledge of the sandbox to which data
belongs to or the location of sandbox memory! For instance,
consider the following program.
1 auto mRLBox = createSandbox(...);
2 tainted<int**> foo = sandbox_invoke(mRLBox, ...);
3 tainted<int*> bar = sandbox_invoke(mRLBox, ...);
4 *foo = bar;
5 bar = *foo;
On line 4, we write bar to the location pointed to by foo.
However, as foo is a tainted variable, foo points to a location
in sandbox memory. Thus dereferencing foo results in a
tainted_volatile reference (which points to sandboxed
memory). So we must swizzle bar from the application
pointer representation to the sandboxed pointer representation,
prior to updating *foo. The swizzling occurs in the over-
loaded = operator of the tainted_volatile type which in C++
has a fixed type signature and is only permitted to take a ref-
erence to the assigned value—it does not include a reference
to mRLBox. The reverse problem occurs on line 5 where the
expression on the right is a tainted_volatile, while the ex-
pression on the left is a tainted. An easy albeit ugly solution
could use a specific API for dereferencing, i.e. replacing *foo
with dereference(foo, mRLBox), however, such approaches
changes the natural syntax expected by a C++ programmer.
Implementing context free swizzling. RLBox instead im-
plements swizzling without knowledge of the sandbox base
address by leveraging the structure of pointer representations.
This approach is applicable for any sandbox whose base
memory is sufficiently aligned, as is the case in our SFI
implementation which is aligned to 4GB. Converting from
an application pointer representation to sandboxed pointer
representation required on line 4 can be easily performed by
clearing the top 32-bits of pointer bar in the overloaded equal-
ity operator. However, the second case which is the conversion
of a sandboxed pointer representation to an application
pointer representation on line 5 is more challenging.
To solve this, we make the observation that we can
successfully learn the sandbox base address by inspecting
the first 32-bits of any example pointer which is (1) not null
(2) is in the same sandbox as the pointer we wish to convert
and (3) is stored in the application pointer format (as a 64-bit
pointer). The implementation of swizzling below shows how
to find such an example pointer below.
#define top32 0xFFFFFFFF00000000
#define bot32 0xFFFFFFFF
tainted<T>& operator=(tainted_volatile<T2>& rhs) {
uintptr_t exampleAppPtr = &(rhs.val);
uintptr_t base = exampleAppPtr & top32;
this->val = base + (rhs.val & bot32);
return *this;
}
Line 4 constructs an example pointer in the body of
operator=, with the expression &(rhs.field). This
expression points to the same memory location as the
variable foo on line 5 in the original program. Importantly,
foo may be used as an example pointer as it is located in the
same sandbox as *foo, is stored in the application pointer
representation, and is not null as we successfully dereferenced
it on line 5, prior to the call of the operator= also on line 5.
This solution is also used to solve similar problems when
supporting pointer arithmetic on tainted types.
B Native Client Tooling Changes
NaCl was originally designed for sandboxing mobile code
in the browser, rather than libraries. We thus had to make
significant modifications to the compiler, optimization passes,
ELF loader, machine model and runtime prior to it being
usable for library sandboxing. We list these changes below.
Loader and Runtime. The NaCl loader does not support
libraries. We thus modify the loader and runtime to save the
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ELF symbol table from when the library is loaded, to provide
symbol resolution.
Threading. On 64-bit platforms, NaCl relies on each sandbox
having unique OS threads due to some design choices in the
use of thread-local storage. However, for library sandboxing,
the same application thread may invoke code from different
sandboxes; therefore we had to modify the NaCl to operate
without this requirement.
Function Invocation. NaCl uses a “springboard”—a piece
of code which enables memory isolation prior to starting
sandbox code—to invoke main with no function parameters.
For library sandboxing, we modify the springboard to allow
arbitrary function invocations with any parameters. We
implemented callback support using the default syscall
mediation mechanism in NaCl to correctly redirect callbacks .
SIMD. NaCl custom compilation toolchain does not support
handwritten SIMD and assembly instructions found in
libraries such as libjpeg-turbo. To mitigate this, we modify
the NASM assembler to assemble this hand-written assembly
to object files that pass NaCl verifier checks. We measured
that this allowing handwritten SIMD instructions provided
a 48% speedup for the SFI based sandboxing on a simple
benchmark rendering a libjpeg image.
Machine Model. The machine model of a platform dictates
the size of various types such as int, long, or pointers.
To maximize performance, NaCl uses a custom machine
model—for example, NaCl uses 32-bit pointers, even in
its 64-bit machine model. However, this can introduce
incompatibilities during library sandboxing when data
structures are transferred between the application and library
To remedy this, we modified the NaCl tooling to ensure
the machine model is consistent with the Firefox application
code. This required making significant changes to the
NaCl Clang toolchain, the NaCl instruction set in LLVM,
NaCl’s implementation of libc and the NaCl runtime. We
implemented these changes carefully such that NaCl Verifier
(the tool used to determine the safety of a NaCl binary) would
not require any modifications, giving us confidence that our
changes do not affect security.
The Wasm toolchains also exhibit similar differences in
the machine model. Rather than make relying on similar large
changes in the Wasm compiler toolchain, we use RLBox
feature to automatically adjust for machine model differences
(§9) to ensure compatibility.
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